1. For that the fundamental rights of the Petitioner are completely suspended and put at the stake, under the impact of the Principal of the finality of the final order of the Supreme Court;

 

2. For that constitution of a Larger Bench of the Supreme Court is most necessitated and warranted to adjudicate and decide most important issues which never before examined that Supreme Court of India have two independent, separate and untrammeled responsibilities; one under Part III of the Constitution and another under Chapter IV of the Constitution which as explained hereinafter, cannot and should not be mixed up. But, application of Non-Maintainable principle of the finality of the final order of the Supreme Court in respect of the Proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution, admittedly has opened the scope of miscarriage of the justice, abuse of the judicial proceedings and orders without jurisdiction or under bias, while from any provision of the Constitution miscarriage of the justice, abuse of the judicial proceedings and orders without jurisdiction or under bias are not permitted.

3. For that infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner based on the State sponsored blackmailing activities caused by the Mafiadom, become absolute, when Writ Petitions filed by the Petitioner, causes miscarriage of justice, abuse of the judicial proceedings and orders without jurisdiction or under bias, by not hearing on merit, similar to observations made Per Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri J. (for C.J. and himself, Variava and Patil JJ.) made at Para 23 in Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC and further made Per Banerjee, J. at Para 62, 68 and 69. Infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner is completely inconsistent with the entire Constitution and should be enforced, by constituting a Larger Bench to hold that Supreme Courts Two independent, separate and untrammeled from each other responsibilities under Part III and Chapter IV of the Constitution, virtually dividing the Supreme Court in to two separate Supreme Courts, 1) under Chapter IV of the Constitution Supreme Court is having Supreme authority of Indian Judiciary; 2) under Article 13 and 32 under Part III of the Constitution Supreme Court having with Supreme responsibility of the guardian, guarantor and watchdog armed with unchallenged, untrammeled, and unrestricted Supreme Powers to protect Indian democracy by protecting the Fundamental Rights of the Individuals. There is no compatibility or match between those two independent, separate and untrammeled responsibilities.

4) For that the principle of finality of final order of the Supreme Court, (Nine Judge Bench (AIR 1967 SC 1:(1966) 3, SCR 744) Judgment) which virtually inferred from Chapter IV of the Constitution is perfectly maintainable in respect of the orders passed by the Supreme Court under its capacity as Supreme Authority of Indian Judiciary, in respect of the matters covered under Chapter IV of the Constitution, but not at all maintainable in respect of orders passed under Article 32 of the Constitution. Application of the principle of finality of final order of the Supreme Court, in respect of the matters of the Petitioner covered under Part III of the Constitution has translated the result not less than "oppressive to judicial conscience", thus "perpetuated irremediable injustice for the Petitioner" thus protections for the criminal acts by criminal means of the Respondent Nos. 25 to 32.

5. For that since the holding of the principle of finality of final order of the Supreme Court, (Nine Judge Bench (AIR 1967 SC 1:(1966) 3, SCR 744) Judgment) mindset of the Supreme Court gradually but slowly started to shift from its responsibility as a Guardian, Guarantor and Watchdog-Protector of the rights guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitution as were held by Six Judge Bench (AIR:1950,Sc: 124, Kania CJ, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, B.K.Mokherjea, And Das JJ.), that: "The Supreme Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringement of such rights" towards complete negative directions that the " it is a settled position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III", while such shifting was not consistent with the object, scope, meaning and ambit of the Article 32 of the Constitution.

6. For that the fundamental rights infringed through Public Interest matters as well as of the individuals are equally important and cannot and should not be ignored one for another. But, under the impact of principle of finality of final order of the Supreme Court, (Nine Judge Bench (AIR 1967 SC 1:(1966) 3, SCR 744) Judgment) emphasis was shifted towards Public Interest Litigations, at the cost of the fundamental rights of individuals guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitution as experienced by the Petitioner, by moving the matter in person.

7. For that the observations interalia made in last 3 lines of Para 7 of the Judgment dated 10^th April 2002, 388-428 SCC (2002) 4 SCC that "It may be further noted that the superior courts of justice do not fall within the ambit of State or other authorities under Article 12 of the Constitution" is not consistent with the scope, meaning, ambit, object and scheme of Article 12 of the Constitution. From the words "The State includes" means the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution is just not limited to "the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India" rather much much wider, thus from its ambit Supreme Court should not have been excluded. From the aforesaid observation such a situation arising as if a Medical Doctor, whose profession is to give a new lease of life to a dying person, claims that death by his hand in no case can be treated as a murder.

8. For that the interpretation not consistent with the guarantees provided under clause (1), (2) and (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution is constitutionally void. The object of Article 32 of the Constitution was to provide ultimate right of remedy in guaranteed manner to each citizen against infringement of fundamental rights. In the entire Constitution, Supreme Court is not empowered or impliedly not empowered to cause miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdiction or under bias, whereas the interpretation that " it is a settled position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III" suggest that the Supreme Court is empowered to cause miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial proceedings or orders without jurisdictions or under bias. This situation was surfaced in Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC under Para 23 by the observation that "These contentions pose the question, whether an order passed by this Court can be corrected under its inherent powers after dismissal of the review petition on the ground that it was passed either without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or due to unfair procedure giving scope for bias which resulted in abuse of the process of the court or miscarriage of justice to an aggrieved person" and at Para 62 that "does it, however, mean and imply a closed door even if the order of this Court depicts that the same stands in violation of natural justice adversely and seriously affecting the rights of the parties or the same depicts manifest injustice rendering the order a mockery of justice", as were also experienced by the Petitioner from the Order passed in his Writ Petition.

9. For that there is no doubt that separate, independent and untrammeled Principle of finality of final orders of Supreme Court is warranted in respect of Part-III of the Constitution, but simultaneously measures to prevent miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdictions or bias is equally warranted, to fulfill the objects of the Guarantees provided under Clause (1) and (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution. But, without having such measures application of the non-maintainable principle of the finality of the final order of the Supreme Court inferred under Chapter IV of the Constitution have caused severe reverse impact against the Fundamental Rights of the Petitioner being guaranteed under clause (1) and (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution and virtually translated as protection for criminal acts by criminal means caused by the Respondent Nos. 25 to 32 under their Nexus with Powerful Politicians and bureaucrats, and non action or favours from Union of India and State of West Bengal supported with embracement of large numbers of judicial officers and Advocates has made lives and liberties of the Petitioner and his family members as miserable with severe magnitude. Learned Mr. Rajiv Dhawan, Senior Lawyer of Supreme Court, described the miserable situation of the Petitioner by his Letter dated 4^th December 1995 interalia that "Many thanks for your letter, which combines juristic concern with the intensity of one having suffered personal atrocity", and opined by the Respondent No. 23 in his letter dated 23^rd May 1995 that "As far as the merit your matter is concerned I am prima facie satisfied that there is a cause of action at least to file a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for appropriate reliefs". Photocopies of both the Letters are annexed with the Writ Petition and marked as ANNEXURE "A-60" and ANNEXURE-"55" respectively.

10. For that the clause (2) of Article 32 of the Constitution directs that "The Supreme Court shall have powers to issue directions or orders or writ, including writs in nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part", which having contained conditions under clause (4) of the Article 32 of the Constitution that "The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution" with further conditions under clause (1) of Article 32 of the Constitution provides that "The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part (Part III) is guaranteed". In such a situation Supreme Court is having complete competency just to ensure enforcement of fundamental rights, and any adverse or negative interpretation cannot having consistency with clause (1) (2) (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution.

11. For that the concept of independent, separate, untrammeled from each other responsibilities of the Supreme Courts under Part III and Chapter IV of the Constitution is also apparent from Article 131 of the Constitution which defined Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in respect of the matters and provisions provided under Chapter IV of the Constitution, while Original Jurisdictions of the Supreme Court under Article 13 and 32 Part III of the Constitution are not referred or included. In fact from the entire Chapter IV of the Constitution nowhere the Jurisdiction and Powers of the Supreme Court under Part III of the Constitution is referred or can be inferred.

12. For that the Jurisdiction and powers including the powers of interpretation in respect of Part III of the Constitution of India is clearly referred, defined, derived and inferred from Clause (1), (2) and (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution of India itself and cannot be imported from outside, which imposing a strict restriction upon all authority including Supreme Court itself by providing that "the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceeding for enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed" and that "the right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution", therefore, no other interpretation can be made or inferred which takes away or abridges the rights conferred under Part III of the Constitution of India or contrary to responsibility laid upon the Supreme Court for enforcement of the fundamental rights.

13. For that object of Article 32 of the Constitution is to ensure ultimate right of remedy against infringement of fundamental rights. This is very important that in the entire Constitution, Supreme Court is not empowered nor have been impliedly empowered to cause miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdiction or under bias, therefore the interpretation that " it is a settled position in law that no judicial order passed by any superior court in judicial proceedings can be said to violate any of the fundamental rights enshrined in Part III" suggests otherwise or ancient and not consistent with the most important core principles of the jurisprudence that that "Justice must be above all" and another core principle of the rule of law which says, Be you ever so high, the law is above you. In fact such interpretation is inferred under the changing mind set of the Supreme Court as aforesaid and responsible for development of such a situation as observed in Para 23, 42, and 68 & 69 of the Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC, from which sufferings of the Petitioner correctly and truly reflected under the impacts of the Order passed in his Writ Petition.

14. For that the efficacy of Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution just defined that "the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within territory of India", which having much lesser efficacy from the efficacy of Supreme Court defined under Article 12 of the Constitution.

15. For that Article 13 and Article 32 of the Constitution of India are important pillars of the Basic Structure of the Constitution of India and cannot be changed or altered to suit political powers or open any discriminatory passage for any one. But, being the Guardian, Guarantor and Watchdog-Protector of the rights guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, admitted that under the human error or otherwise miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdiction or under bias were possible, by Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC by the observation made at Para 23. Such situation is developed due to application of the principle of the finality of final order of the Supreme Court without evolving appropriate measures to prevent miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdiction or under any bias.

16. For that by the said Judgment dated 10 the April 2002 388-428 SCC (2002) 4 SCC it was held that under Article 32, 132, 133, 134, 136, 226 and 12 of the Constitution of India Supreme Court cannot issue a Writ to a High Court or one Bench of Supreme Court cannot issue a writ to another Bench of the Supreme Court even if the latter is a smaller oneMore so because neither a Judicial order passed by a superior court can be said to be violative of fundamental rights nor are the superior courts "State" within the meaning of Art 12. Such interpretation is based on dependence of the Indian Judiciary upon the English Law, as it appears from the Paragraph 6 of the Said Judgment Per Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri J. (for C.J. and himself, Variava and Patil JJ.) Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC. English law is not suitable for Indian requirements, and conditions, nor consistent with the object, scope, meaning and ambit of Article 32 of the Constitution, neither now binding under Indian Independence treaty. While observations made under Para 6 of the said Judgment dated 10^th April 2002 is giving impressions that efficacy of the Supreme Court of India is not independent and still tagged with the English law. Otherwise, under Part III of the Constitution Supreme Court is Superior court even over the Supreme Court under Chapter IV of the Constitution, and competent to issue Writ of Certiorari. Infact under the aforesaid observations provisions under Article 132, 133, 134, 136, 226 of the Constitution has been mixed with Article 12 and 32 of the Constitution to infer powers or jurisdictions with regards to provisions under Part III of the Constitution, whereas Article 132, 133, 134, 136, 226 of the Constitution have no relevance or concerned with the provisions provided under Part III of the Constitution. The concept of two separate, independent and untrammeled from each other responsibilities of Supreme Courts clearly apparent from Article 139 Chapter IV of the Constitution, which provides separate Jurisdiction of the Writs by the provisions: Conferment on the Supreme Court of powers to issue certain writs, that "Parliament may by law confer on Supreme Court power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for any purposes other than those mentioned in clause (2) of article 32" with clear object to define that the responsibility of the Supreme Court under Chapter IV of the Constitution is completely different from the responsibilities under Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, under Clause (2) of Article 32 of the Constitution "The Supreme Court shall have powers to issue directions or orders or writ, including writs in nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this part" which means for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III, if necessary a Larger Bench can issue a Writ to a Smaller Bench. Even today the application of the principle of finality of final order of the Supreme Court is a Nine Judge Bench Writ upon the Smaller Benches.

17. For that this is very important that under Article 13 Part III of the Constitution of India Supreme Court have been constituted as Guardian, Guarantor and watchdog to protect the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution as such empowered to protect such rights even from laws in force includes laws passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution inconsistent with Part III or any law includes any Ordinance, order, bye-laws, rule, regulation, notification, etc., which takes away or abridges the rights conferred by Part III shall not be made by the State otherwise in so far as they are inconsistent with or contravention of Part III, empowered to declare as void, while under Chapter IV of the Constitution no such or similar powers have been provided to the Supreme Court, from which it is clear that efficacy of the Supreme Court under Part III is supreme while efficacy of Supreme Court under Chapter IV of the Constitution is limited to the respective provisions, in such a situation Supreme Court cannot pronounce any Judgment or pass any order or infer any other or inferior interpretation not consistent with the provisions provided under Article 13 and 32 of the Constitution, on the basis of any provision provided under Chapter IV of the Constitution. But, orders without the examining the matters on merits, passed in the Writ Petition filed and moved by the Petitioner for enforcement of fundamental rights, takes away or abridges his rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, thus caused impacts not less than "oppressive to judicial conscience", thus "perpetuated irremediable injustice for the Petitioner" similar to observations made in last two lines of Para 42 of Judgment 414 (2002) 4 SCC, and reverse impact of such orders translated into as virtual umbrella for the mafia activities prevailing against the Petitioner.

18. For that under human error or otherwise, but for non existence of the measures to prevent miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial process or orders without jurisdiction or bias, the orders passed by Supreme Court in the matters of the Petitioners caused hands off from its responsibility laid down by Article 32 of the Constitution in respect of infringement of his fundamental rights being just not rarest amongst most rares, but unusual and unprecedented of its own kind from whole of democratic India, and under politics-crime-nexus, thus orders of Supreme Court in the Writ Petition filed and moved by the Petitioner depicts manifest injustice similar to "does it, however, mean and imply a closed door even if the order of this Court depicts that the same stands in violation of natural justice adversely and seriously affecting the rights of the parties or the same depicts manifest injustice rendering the order a mockery of justice" as were observed in the said Judgment dated 10^th April 2002.

19. For that Article 145(1)( c) and 147 of the Constitution having no relevance with the jurisdiction and powers of the Supreme Court under Part III of the Constitution.

20. For that Article 145(1)( c) of the Constitution provides that "Supreme Court may from time to time, with the approval of the President, makes rules for regulating generally the practices and procedures of the Court including rules as to the proceedings in the Court for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III", means rules should be in affirmative manner for enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III, not to deprive directly or indirectly from such rights.

21. For that from the language of provision provided under Article 147 of the Constitution it is ample clear that the Supreme Court empowered to make interpretation with refrence "In this Chapter and Chapter V of Part VI, references to any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of this Constitution shall be construed as including references to any substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935" "or of any Order in Council or order made thereunder, or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, or of any order made thereunder". From the words "In this Chapter and, Chapter V of Part VI," it is ample clear that Part III of the Constitution is not included in the scope, meaning and ambit of the interpretation under Article 147 of the Constitution.

22. That apart from the aforesaid language of Article 147 of the Constitution from the factual position this is further clear that "The Fundamental Rights" never exists in the Government of India Act, 1935 nor were subject matter of the orders passed by any "Council" whether the word "Council" denotes to British Privy Council or not, nor were subject matter of Indian Independence Act, 1947, which was enacted as per agreement between the Indian National Congress and British Government, based on the proposal of the Cabinet Mission from the British Government, nor it is inferred from any provision that Supreme Court is empowered to change meaning of any provision of the Part III of the Constitution. Therefore, Article 147 of the Constitution does not included the Powers of the Supreme Court to make interpretation of substantial question of Law in respect of the Provisions prvided Under part III of the Constitution. However, such Power is included in Article 32 of the Constitution itself, and cannot be inferred from anywhere else.

23. For that inconsistency or contravention between Article 13 under Part III with Article 147 under Chapter IV of the Constitution clearly apparent from the factual position that Article 13 of the Constitution have empowered the Supreme Court to declare "All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, (means inclusive of the Government of India Act, 1935 and Indian Independence Act, 1947) in so far as they are inconsistent with the provision with the provision of this Part, shall to the extent of such inconsistency, (can) be (declared) void", from which it is ample clear that Supreme Court have been empowered even to declare "Government of India Act, 1935 or Indian Independence Act, 1947" if found to be inconsistent with the provision of Part III, to the extent of such inconsistency, as void". From this it is further clear that efficacy of the Article 13 of the Constitution is much superior than the Article 147 of the Constitution, and that the interpretation of Article 13 of the Constitution cannot and should not be construed as the interpretation of the Government of India Act, 1935, or of any Order in Council or order made thereunder, or of the Indian Independence Act, 1947. From the aforesaid situation concept of separate, independent and untrammeled two responsibilities of Supreme Courts is clearly apparent, thus the principle of the finality of the final orders of the Supreme Court arrived or inferred under Article 147 of the Constitution can not and should not be made applicable in respect of Part III of the Constitution.

24. For that the Respondent No 25 has caused severe, constant, regular and continuous infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner through atrocities with intensity having with severe magnitude, with the help of criminals and the Government machinery. Such rights were embedded when severe misuse of the powers and abuse of the authority by Shri Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, were caused personally under hands in glove with the unscrupulous businessmen-turned-mafia Respondent No. 25 knowing fully well, by all means and method to takes away the livelihoods and lives of the family members and Petitioner himself making it miserable. Respondent No. 25 and his associates, including Respondent No. 26 to 32 have embraces a large number of Judicial Officer and each and every Advocate of the Petitioner and with the help of large number of anti-socials caused such a serious situation which can ensure depriving him from his rights to get justice. The infringement of such rights of the Petitioner is still effective with the same grave situation.

25. For that the Petitioner has suffered 42 stab wounds all over his body inflicted under the plot hatched by Respondent No. 25, and his associates including the Respondent Nos. 27, 28, 29, 31 and 32. The Mafiadom controlled by the respondent No. 25 with the help of the Respondent Nos. 26 to 32 and others now active against the Petitioner was developed when misappropriation of public funds to the tune of about Rs.15 crores was caused, when Shri Kamal Basu, the then Mayor of Respondent No. 19 under influence from Shri Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, arranged contract for rebuilding of the burnt portion of New (Hogg) Market in favour of M/S. Martin Burn Limited, a Company controlled and managed by the Respondent No.25 and his relations. After the said contract Respondent No. 19 adopted one after another ways and means to support blackmailing activities run by the said Mafiadom. Embracement of the Judicial Officers and Advocates of the Petitioner were arranged vehemently with the help of Shri Jyoti Basu and other influential people, to provide legal coverage to blackmailing activities run by said Mafiadom against the Petitioner and protections were provided by the State of West Bengal to the culprits as they were hand in glove with each other to grab the property of the Petitioner. The Petitioner was stabbed with knives several times and his sons legs were crushed by a staged truck accident, caused under Police protection, putting their lives in danger and fundamental rights at a severe stake, with constant threats to lives of his family members and him in Kolkata, as a result he and his entire family had to flea from Kolkata to New Delhi, and still to live under hiding. God knows, whether after going back from the Court premises Petitioner will reach or not at his residence, as agents of the said Mafiadom are equally active in Delhi too.

26. For that by the observations made in Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 388-426 (2002) 4 SCC by the observation made at Para 23 Supreme Court inferred that their might be orders -which-, may suspend the fundamental rights as were suspended in the matters of the Petitioner, but under the impact of the principle of finality of the order of the Supreme Court (Nine Judge Bench (AIR 1967 SC 1:(1966) 3, SCR 744) Judgment), said Judgment could not reach up to desire level to provide curative passage just in conformity with clause (4) of the Constitution of India, which does not and cannot permit any conditionality for restoration of the suspended fundamental rights, beyond the scope, meaning, ambit, object and scheme of Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

27. For that Article 145(1) (c ) does not empowered the Supreme Court to assign its Judicial powers to Registrar or any other person or authority to decide the fate of a Writ petition. Such assignment is not in affirmative in accordance with and purpose of Article 145(1) (c ) of the Constitution thus application of Rule 5 Under Order XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966, in respect of the provisions under Part III of the Constitution is beyond the scope, meaning and ambit of Article 32 and 145(1) (c ) of the Constitution and such is void.

28. For that Petitioner sought remedies for enforcement of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 32 of the Constitution, by his last Writ Petition filed under filing Diary No. 17454 / 2002 on 4^th September 2002 which was refused to register as a Writ Petition under Rule 5 Under Order XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966, in complete inconsistent to Clause (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution. In fact Refusal to register as a Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner, at the stage of the Registry, in the matter of the Petitioner is not less than death warrant against the Petitioner, as impact of it causes protections of the criminal acts, deeds and misconducts of the Mafia Elements, influential people who actually are the enemies of the society, and responsible for severe attempts to kill the Petitioner and his son.

29. For that the matters of the petitioner, the principle of the finality of final orders of the Supreme Court takes away and abridges the rights to remedy provided under Article 32 of the Constitution of the Petitioner, as equal apprehensions from the observation made in Para 42 of Judgment 10^th April 2002 414 (2002) 4 SCC were appears that "The concern of this Court for rendering justice in a cause is not less important than the principle of finality of its judgment."

30. For that from the Judgment (2002) 4 SCC dated 10^th April 2002 Supreme Court virtually admitted by way of observations that the principle of the finality of the final order of the Supreme Court may permits miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial proceedings or orders without jurisdictions or under bias whereas under the scope, meaning, ambit, object and scheme of Article 32 of the Constitution there are no rooms for miscarriage of justice, abuse of judicial proceedings or orders without jurisdictions or under bias, if the same depicts as infringement of the fundamental rights;

31. For that with complete inconsistency with the provision of the Article 32 of the Constitution, the principle of the finality of the final orders of the Supreme Court, virtually have changed the scope, meaning, ambit, object and scheme of the Article 32 of the Constitution, particularly in respect of the matters pertained to the Petitioner causing severe damage to the Petitioners rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution;

32. For that the assessment of the Vohra Committee that "An organised crime Syndicate/Mafia generally commences" and that "In the bigger cities, the main source of income relates to real estate- forcibly occupying lands/buildings, procuring such properties at cheap rates by forcing out the existing occupants/tenants etc. Over time, the money power thus acquired is used for building up contacts with bureaucrats and politicians and expansion of activities with impunity. The money power is used to develop a network of muscle-power which is also used by politicians during elections." and that "CBI has reported that all over India crime Syndicates have become a law unto themselves. Even in the smaller towns and rural areas, muscle-men have become the order of the day. Hired assassins have become a part of these organisations. The nexus between the criminal gangs, police, bureaucracy and politicians has come out clearly in various parts of the country" were competing with the atrocities suffered by the Petitioner. In fact much before, the Vohra Committee submitted its Report, the Petitioner realized that black money powers of the Mafiadom controlled by the Respondent No. 25 and his associates including Respondent Nos. 26 to 32 is main source for building up the contacts with the powerful politicians including Shri Jyoti Basu, and others, which ultimately caused infringement of fundamental right of the Petitioner. In such a considerations, starting from 1987 petitioner forwarded his numberless representations, complaints, applications before each and every authority, requesting thereby to check the huge black money powers of the said Mafiadom even submitting detail facts relates to some of the transactions based on the payment of huge black-money, but Government of India rather acted to protect black money powers of the said Mafiadom, thus encouraged his blackmailing activities causing severe infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner.

33. For that the Petitioner is sufferer of the black money powers of the Respondent No. 25 and his associates including Respondent No. 26 to 32 as he referred to respective authorities about respective transactions including executed through two of the Companies of the Respondent No. 25 based on violation of the Income tax Act, and this fact was now established, as per the principle settled by the Judgment dated 13^th March 2001 in the Civil Appeal 5426 of 1997 by S.P.Bharucha, J, as His lordship then was and N. Santosh Hegde and Y. K. Sabarwal, JJ. If the respective authority could have acted in accordance with the law the properties referred in the aforesaid transactions should have been vested with the Government of India for violation of Section 269UC of Income Tax Act, or otherwise the matter should have been the subject matter of the said Judgment, as several other similar matters relates to various properties from the country were part of the said Judgment. After the said Judgment on 11^th July 2001, Petitioner sent a representation to the Union of India, asking thereby to take appropriate steps in the matter, in accordance with the said Judgment. But, Government of India takes no action in the matter. In fact by not taking appropriate action against black money powers the Union of India permitted the Respondent No. 25 and his associates including the Respondent Nos. 26 to 32 to use their black money powers to cause severe infringement of the fundamental rights of the Petitioner;

34. For that the Mafiadom controlled by the Respondent No. 25 to 32 have tried their best level to embraces a large number of Judicial Officers to effect the Administration of Justice, which time-to-time Petitioner put on the record submitting Letter Petitions to the Honble Chief justice of India and / or Honble Chief justice of Calcutta High Court with prayers to ensure enforcement of his Fundamental Rights;

35. That Five Judge Constitution Bench in its Judgment Dated 10^th April 2002 (2002) 4 SCC 419) moved to pronounce a very important Judgment and at Para 52 and 54 allowed to file curative Writ Petitions, but by mixing the provisions provided under Chapter IV of the Constitution of India meant for the restricted and specific purposes, with the independent untrammeled and separate Supreme powers provisions provided under Part III of the Constitution of India, as such condition to file a Certificate from Senior Lawyer of the Supreme Court, was imposed in complete inconsistent with Clause (4) of Article 32 of the Constitution,

36. That application of Rule 5 Order XVIII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 in 1997 in respect of the Proceedings under Part III of the Constitution Supreme Court vehemently hands off from its responsibility as were admitted by Six Judge Constitution Bench (AIR:1950, SC: 124, Kania CJ, Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mahajan, B.K.Mokherjea, And Das JJ.), which hold interalia that: "The Supreme Court is thus constituted the protector and guarantor of fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to entertain applications seeking protection against infringement of such rights." and opened the doors to compromise with the Core Principles of the jurisprudence that the "Justice must above all" and that "No one is the above law".

37. For that under the fundamental rights of Justice the Respondent Nos. 1 to 20 are responsible for the damages causes by their respective omission or commission or non-actions or ill-actions against or favours for Respondent Nos. 25 to 32 and others in respect of the respective Memorandums, Complaints, applications and representations time to time placed before them by the Petitioner.

38. For that the Rule 5 of ORDER XVIII (Petitions generally) cannot be made applicable overruling the Rule 7 and 8 of the PART IV ORDER XXXV (APPLICATION FOR ENFORCEMENT OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS) in respect of the Application filed for "Mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, Quo-warranto and other Directions or Orders as it is clear from the Rule 7 and 8 of the PART IV ORDER XXXV that the Petition shall be posted for preliminary hearing and upon hearing, if Court satisfied that no fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution has been infringed or in other words no satisfactory cause of action is appears from the Petition, it shall be dismissed. Therefore, duplication of the powers is unconstitutional and as such Rule 5 of ORDER XVIII is liable to be declared null and void, as far as its applicability is concerned to Application under Article 32 of the Constitution is concerned.

39. For that the Petitioner has one landed property at 92/1/1A, Jai Bibi Road, within the area of the Bally Police Station within the District of Howrah (West Bengal). Since long time Petitioner was suffering the atrocities caused by Mafiadom controlled by the Respondent No. 25 and his associates, as such Petitioner could not able to look after his aforesaid property for more than last 15 years. It is reported that property have been forcibly occupied by some one. Since the Petitioner is not in a position to move freely, under the severe threats from said Mafiadom, Petitioner cannot take appropriate actions in the matter. In recent period people have been encouraged to acquire the possession of the valuable properties by force, as were also admitted by the Vohra Committee in its Report, damaging the basic objects of the fundamental rights. Therefore, item No. 65 as Description of Suit under Part V (Suit Relating to Immovable Property) under the Schedule for the Period of Limitations as the "prescribed period" under section 2(j) and 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is completely inconsistent to Part III of the Constitution and should be declared as void.

40. For that under the fundamental rights of Justice any order or Judgment which under the law is not due but obtained by the Respondent Nos. 25 to 32 under their embracement with any Judicial Officer or otherwise, are never become legally valid, irrespective of whatever provisions were under the Law of Limitation.

41. For that as per news published in the Hindustan Times dated 18^th September 1998 "China punishes 5,000 judges, prosecutors in eight months", as because the violation in the profession and neglect of work ethics by some officials in judicial department has posed a threat to social stability. Similarly in India people in powers are keenly interested to see the judiciary, to suit their own interest, in the garb of the accountability. While, in the interest of the fair Judiciary this is more venerable that Judiciary itself should evolved some concrete mechanism to check miscarriage of justice, abuse of the judicial proceedings and orders without jurisdiction or under bias, at each and every levels. Most important part of such thing is that China is not following British Privy Council Judgments, as Indian Judiciary depending inmost of the important Judgments upon the British Privy Council Judgments, which giving impressions that still Indian Judiciary having allegiance to the British Privy Council, while Indian Judges, having full competency compatible from the Judges of any other country to hold Judgments in consideration of the Indian requirement and environments.