The extracts from the observations made by the Members of Constituent Assembly of India during such Debate
are referred herein:
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA - VOLUME VII
Thursday, the 9th December, 1948 The Constituent Assembly of India met in the Constitution Hall, New Delhi,
at Ten of the Clock, Mr. Vice-President (Dr. H. C. Mookherjee) in the Chair.
"Shrimati G. Durgabai (Madras: General): Mr. Vice-President, Sir,
I have great pleasure in supporting this article. While doing so, I wish to place a few
points before the House for its consideration."
"Sir, the right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of a person's rights
is a very valuable right that is guaranteed under this Constitution. In my view this is a right which is fundamental to all the fundamental rights guaranteed under this Constitution. The main principle of this article is to secure an effective remedy to the fundamental rights guaranteed
under this Constitution. As we are all aware, a right without an expeditious and effective remedy serves no purpose at all,
nor is it worth the paper on which it is written. Therefore, as I have already stated, this article secures that kind of advantage
that it will ensure the effective enforcement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to a person."
"Sir, with these few words I have great pleasure in supporting this article. I commend it to acceptance of
"Rev. Jerome D'Souza (Madras: General): Mr. Vice-President, I too should like to join my distinguished colleague,
Shrimati Durgabai, in expressing gratification at the passing of this very important article which may justly be considered
to be of the gravest character, and of the most far-reaching importance. I am sure, Sir, that Members of this House will recall
to their minds that today is exactly the second anniversary of the opening of this great Assembly, and surely it is not without
some significance that, nearing the end of our discussion on the Fundamental rights, this coping-stone of the structure of
those rights should be placed today.
I should like to draw the attention of the House, Sir, to the implications of this article, implications
which possibly are not obvious at the first reading. This House, and through this House the Legislatures that have to rule
this country in future, by a laudable and significant act of self-denial or self-abnegation, places under the power of a Supreme
Judicature the enforcement of certain laws and certain principles, and remove them from the purview and the control of the
Parliaments which will be elected in future years. They wish to put these rights beyond the possibility of attack or change
which may be brought about by the passions and vicissitudes of party politics, by placing them under the jurisdiction of judges
appointed in the manner provided for later on in this Constitution. Sir, it is because we all believe,--and that is the implication
of this chapter of fundamental Rights,--that man has certain rights that are inalienable, that cannot be questioned by any
humanly constituted legislative authority, that these Fundamental Rights are framed in this manner and a sanction and a protection
given to them by this provision for appeal to the Supreme Court.
As I said, Sir, the implication of this is that an individual must be protected even against the collective
action of people who may not fully appreciate his needs, his rights, his claims. And the sacredness of the individual personality,
the claims of his conscience, are, I venture to say, based upon a philosophy, an outlook on life which are essentially spiritual.
Sir, if all our people and their outlook were entirely materialistic, if right and wrong were to be judged by a majority vote,
then there is no significance in fundamental rights and the placing of them under the protection of the High Court. It is
because we believe that the fullest and the most integral definition of democracy includes and is based upon this sacredness
of the individual, of his personality and the claims of his conscience, that we have framed these rights.
I say, Sir, further that in the last analysis we have to make an appeal to a moral law and through the moral
law to a Supreme Being, if the highest and the fullest authority is to be given and the most stable sanction to be secured
for these fundamental rights. Sir, Mahatma Gandhi, in one of his unforgettable phrases, referring to the desire to have a
secular Constitution and to avoid the name of the Supreme Being in it, cried out, "You may keep out the Name, but you will
not keep out the Thing from that Constitution". And, Sir, I believe that these fundamental rights and their implications are
really tantamount to a confession that beyond human agencies and human legislatures there is a Power which has to be submitted
to, and there are rights which have to be respected.
Sir, we have introduced in these Fundamental Rights certain provisions--necessary perhaps in present conditions--that
in Government institutions instruction in different religions may not be given, in order that the calm atmosphere of our institutions
may not be disturbed by controversies. But I hope and pray that those provisos, prudent though they are, may not exclude the
teaching of ethical principles based upon truths acceptable to all, upon the existence of a Supreme Being and the rights of
the individual conscience formed under His guidance. I am sure that religious controversies could be avoided on the basis
of those universally accepted truths. It is certain that our national culture and civilization are based upon and permeated
by this belief and this conviction; otherwise there would be no meaning in these fundamental rights. A speaker who preceded
me asked: "Why is it that provision has been made to change this Constitution? Why should not these sacred rights be placed
beyond the possibility of abrogation?" I would answer him: "If the convictions and the faith of our people go away, there
is no use in trying to protect these rights by sanctions. The rights and the sanctions would be illusory. But if faith remains,
no one will want to touch them."
By this article we give to our Supreme Judicature a power, a status and a dignity which will call from them
the highest qualities of integrity and uprightness. The full meaning of this article should be borne in mind when we come
to that Part of the Constitution beginning with article 103, when we shall have to scrutinise the steps by which an upright
and absolutely fair judiciary will be established in this land. When we consider that Part, let us recall these Rights and
make sure that all these various provisions will be enforced in a just and fearless manner.
Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar: Mr. Vice-President,Sir, the Supreme Court according to me is the Supremeguardian
of the citizen's rights in any democracy. I would even go further and say that it is the soul of democracy. The executive
which comes into being for the time being isapt to abuse its powers, and therefore the Supreme Court must be there, strong
and un-trammelled by the day to day passions which may bring a set of people into power and throw them out also in a very
short time. In less than three or four years during which a parliament is in being, many governments may come and go, and
if the fundamental rights of the individual are left to the tender mercies of the Government of the day, they cannot be called
fundamental rights at all. On the other hand, the judges appointed to the Supreme Court can be depended upon to be the guardians
of the rights and privileges of the citizens, the majority and the minority alike. So far as the fundamental rights are concerned,
my humble view is that there is no difference between the rights and privileges of individual citizens, whether they belong
to the majority community or to the minority community. Both must be allowed to exercise freedom of religion, freedom of conscience,
must be allowed to exercise their language and use the script which naturally belongs to them. These and other rights must
be carefully watched and for this purpose the Supreme Court has been vested with the supreme ultimate jurisdiction.
So far as the rights of the minorities are concerned, some other provision has also been made in this Constitution
in article 299, under which a special officer or officers are to be appointed to watch their interests and to report to the
President of the Union, as also to the Governor, on how far the minority rights that have been enumerated in this and the
other parts of the Constitution are being observed, and it is the duty of the President or the Governor to lay this report
before the legislature. But this in itself will not do unless the Supreme Court is watchful and is allowed to pull up any
executive government if it goes astray.
Sir, I agree with my predecessors who have spoken that this is the most important article in the whole constitution
as it is the guardian of the people's rights. So far as I know, in recent years some provincial legislatures have passed laws
abrogating the writ of habeas corpus. Such latitude with people's rights ought not to be allowed in any event.
Then as regards clause (4), my friend suggested that this clause ought to be removed. I do not agree with
him, though I agree that the wording here is a little broad and is likely to be abused. I am sure that amount of latitude
ought to be given to the government of the day. If any emergency is proclaimed, I am sure that the rights guaranteed by this
article will be suspended only for the period of the emergency but not for another six months after the emergency is over,
though it is open to the President to allow the same state of affairs to continue for a period of six months after the emergency
is over. It is equally open to the President to say that this clause will be abrogated only during the period of the emergency
and not for a further period of six months after the expiry of the emergency.
B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur (Madras: Muslim): Mr. Vice-President, Sir, I wish to speak a few words on this article.
As was observed by Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar, I would say that this is the most important article of the whole Constitution
and we have to take care to see that the rights conferred by this article are not watered down or in any way modified by other
articles or even by the other clauses of this every article. Now, Sir, recent experience after we gained independence has
taught us that we have to be much more careful in safeguarding the individual liberties and the rights of the citizens now
than when we were ruled by the foreigners. I must say that the recent behaviour of certain provincial governments has taught
us that it is very necessary to take careful measures to see that they are not allowed to behave in the manner they have behaved.
I am referring to the way in which the sacred rights and liberties of the person were being dealt with by certain provincial
governments under the cloak of the powers that they are said to possess. Very often, Sir, it has become the fashion with these
Provincial Governments to say: "Well, some state of emergency has arisen and therefore, in the public interest, we shall utilities
the powers conferred by the Public Safety Act and we shall have to curtail the liberties of so many people and put them in
jail". And this is done without those people knowing on what grounds they are arrested, what is the sin that they have committed
against the State or against the peace of the country, in order to deserve the curtailment of their liberty in this irresponsible
fashion; and they are kept in that state of mind for weeks and months, without even being told what the ground is on which
they are arrested and detained, even though the Government is bound to furnish them with the reasons for their arrest and
detention, under the provisions of the Act under which the Government proposed to arrest them.
Now, Sir, if we look at the irresponsible way in which things were done very recently, it is very necessary
that we must have very strong safeguards against the misuse and abuse of the powers which may be conferred on these Governments.
I would say, Sir, that one principle which we have to bear in mind and we should always keep in view in framing this Constitution
is that ministries may come and ministries may go, but the judicial administration must goon unaffected by the vicissitudes
in the lives of these ministries and the changes in the Government. It is more to preserve their own power, I mean, the power
of the particular party or the clique in power that these measures are resorted to than for any public purpose. Such a state
of affairs should never be allowed to be tolerated. I shall refer to one instance, Sir.
In Madras the legislature was in session and all of a sudden, one evening, a notification was issued that
the legislature was prorogued. For what reason it was done, nobody knew, and the next morning an ordinance was issued. To
what effect? Apart from so many other things, there was the Public Safety Act and under that Act many people were arrested
and detained in jail, without even being told what they are arrested for and why they are detained. Well, they were forced
to resort to such remedies as were available under the existing law and applications were pending in the High Court for issue
of writs of Habeas Corpus and the High Court issued in deserving cases writs of Habeas Corpus. The moment a person was released
by the order of the High Court, that very moment he was re-arrested and put in jail again. And not satisfied with all these
apparently, the Government felt annoyed by the independent way in which the High Court was exercising the legal powers conferred
on it under Section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. What happened was that one evening the Legislature was prorogued and
the next morning an ordinance was issued, even taking away the power of the High Court to issue writs under section 491 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. Now, Sir, is there any bona fides in this? Can any reasonable man say that this could be done
with any bona fides? This is the most scandalous way in which the powers conferred on the Government were being exercised.
Under the cover of the powers conferred on them, they have acted in the most irresponsible way. Therefore, it is that I say,
Sir, that the powers of courts should not be made to depend upon the will and pleasure of the Government and they should under
no circumstances be allowed to interfere with the powers that vest in courts of law. if the very guarantee of personal liberty
on which democratic form of Government is based and the powers vested in courts of law to enforce such rights independently
are allowed to be interfered with, no one is sage. Of course, if is not a question of majority community; it is not a question
of minority community but the powers that be at the time clap in jail such of the individuals or groups of people, whom they
do not like and whom they do not want to be at liberty, perhaps for the fear that they may undermine the power which they
are enjoying. It is one thing to make safeguards on occasions when there is general disturbance of the peace of the country,
but it is quite another thing to give full powers to the Governments to do anything they like under the guise of these `emergency
powers' and empower them to take away powers vested in Courts of Law to protect the personal liberty of citizens.
Now, Sir, I would only like to point out this, that this is certainly one of the very important rights which
has been conferred under this Constitution, but I am afraid, Sir, that clause (4) takes away with one hand what is given by
the other, and therefore, I would heartily support the amendment that has been moved for the deletion of this clause. There
is no necessity for that clause at all. Of course, as regards the powers to be exercised in case of emergency, there is provision
under section 280 and even that would require modification and we shall have to deal with it when we reach that article, but
by the provisions of this clause whatever powers are given by the previous clauses are interfered with and I would strongly
support the amendment for the deletion of this clause. There is no necessity for it and as has been already pointed out by
one of the honourable Members this will lead to a conflict with article 280 and there will be complications arising out of
it. With these few words, I support the amendment for the deletion of this clause.
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena (United Provinces: General):Mr. Vice-President, Sir, now we have come to this last
part of this Chapter and this article 25 gives the right to every citizen in the country to see that all the liberties guaranteed
in this chapter are made available to him. He can go to the Supreme Court and demand that these laws been forced. Sir, this
is the crowning section of the whole chapter. Without it, all the articles which we have passed will have no meaning. As my
honourable Friend, Mr. Ayyangar, has said, this is the most important section in the Constitution. This is, in fact, what
makes all the fundamental rights become real. Everybody can have his remedies if any wrong is done to him, under this article.
With these words, Sir, I support this article.
Shri Rohini Kumar Chaudhri: Sir, I welcome this article because the enunciation of these fundamental rights
would be meaningless if this article were not here to enable us to get our justice from the Supreme Court. I can quite understand
the coyness of my friend Mr. Naziruddin Ahmad while he was moving his amendment. After all the man who is always fond of finding
out small faults of drafting has been caught napping, and it has been found, and he has himself admitted it, that the whole
of his amendment is not explicit. But I would submit that what he intended to convey has been conveyed by the article itself.
Every person will have the right to move the Supreme Court whenever he finds that a fundamental right has been infringed.
Supposing we want to say that the Queensway is open to traffic, one need not say that every person shall have the right to
go through Queensway. Similarly, the article as it stands here is quite explicit and does not require the amendment tabled
by Mr.Naziruddin Ahmad.
I now come to the fourth clause of article 25. I wish I had spoken before my honourable Friend Mr. Ananthasayanam
Ayyangar had spoken because he would have been able to explain some of the difficulties which I feel about this clause. Furthermore,
I as well as most members of the House look upon our honourable Friend Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangaras something akin to Guru
Dronacharya of old who can, notwithstanding his personal feelings and opinions, give a proper interpretation of the provision
as taken by the framers of this draft. Subject to correction I consider that clause (4) should have been omitted or there
should be a substantial modification of this clause. The Fundamental rights are in the very nature of them rights which should
never be taken away from the people. According to this clause these Rights can be taken away in a state of emergency. Article
280 says that in a state of emergency the President can keep the whole of article 25 suspended. Let us see what will be the
result of this suspension--what will be the evil effect and what may be the possible good effect of this suspension. The evil
effect of this suspension would be that in a state of emergency you can ignore article 11 which deals with untouchability.
That is to say we conceive a set of circumstances which would entitle the State or any person to infringe against article
11 and go without any punishment. Any state, or any temple or any authority can infringe article 11 in a state of emergency.
Does this House support such a view? Will the House under any circumstances agree to a suspension of the Constitution in so
far as article 25 is concerned, and allow people who infringe against it to go with impunity?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Mr. Vice-President, Sir, of the amendments that have been moved to this
article I can only accept amendment No. 789 which stood in the name of Mr. Baig but which was actually moved by Mr. Naziruddin
Ahmad. I accept it because it certainly improves the language of the draft. With regard to the other amendments I shall first
of all take up the amendment (No. 801) moved by Mr. Tajamul Husain and the amendment (No. 802) moved by Mr.Karimuddin. Both
of them are of an analogous character. The object of the amendment moved by Mr. Tajamul Husain is to delete altogether sub-clause
(4) of this article and Mr.Karimuddin's amendment is to limit the language of sub-clause (4) by the introduction of the words
`in case of rebellion or invasion'.
Now, Sir, with regard to the argument that clause (4) should be deleted, I am afraid, if I may say so without
any offence, that it is a very extravagant demand, a very tall order. There can be no doubt that while there are certain fundamental
rights which the State must guarantee to the individual in order that the individual may have some security and freedom to
develop his own personality, it is equally clear that in certain cases where, for instance, the State's very life is in jeopardy,
those rights must be subject to a certain amount of limitation. Normal, peaceful times are quite different from times of emergency.
In times of emergency the life of the State itself is in jeopardy and if the State is not able to protect itself in times
of emergency, so that it may survive that emergency and live to discharge its functions in order that the individual under
the aegis of the State may develop, must be guaranteed as safely as the right of an individual. I know of no Constitution
which gave fundamental rights but which gives them in such a manner as to deprive the State in times of emergency to protect
itself by curtailing the rights of the individual. You take any Constitution you like, where fundamental rights are guaranteed;
you will also find that provision is made for the State to suspend these in times of emergency. So far, therefore, as the
amendment to delete clause (4) is concerned, it is a matter of principle and I am afraid I cannot agree with the Mover of
that amendment and I must oppose it.
Now, Sir I will go into details My Friend Mr. Tajamul Husain drew a very lurid picture by referring to various
articles which are included in the Chapter dealing with Fundamental Rights. He said, here is a right to take water, there
is a right to enter a shop, there is freedom to go to a bathing ghat. Now, if clause (4) came into operation, he suggested
that all these elementary human rights which the Fundamental part guarantees--of permitting a man to go to a well to drink
water, to walk on the road, to go to a cinema or a theatre, without any let or hindrance--will also disappear. I cannot understand
from where my friend Mr. Tajamul Husain got this idea. If he had referred to article 279 which relates to the power of the
President to issue a proclamation of emergency, he would have found that clause (4) which permits suspension of these rights
refers only to article 13 and to no other article. The only rights that would be suspended under the proclamation issued by
the President under emergency are contained in article 13; all other articles and the rights guaranteed there under would
remain intact, none of them would be affected. Consequently, the argument which he presented to the House is entirely outside
the provisions contained in article 279.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: All that it does is to suspend the remedies. I thought I would deal with
that when I was dealing with the general question as to the nature of these remedies, and therefore I did not touch upon it
Taking up the point of Mr. Karimuddin, what he tries to do is to limit clause (4) to cases of rebellion or
invasion. I thought that if he had carefully read article 275, there was really no practical difference between the provisions
contained in article 275 and the amendment which he has proposed. The power to issue a proclamation of emergency vested in
the President by article 275 is confined only to cases when there is war or domestic violence.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Amedkar: Certainly. An emergency does not merely arise when war has taken place--the
situation may very well be regarded as emergency when war is threatened. Consequently, if the wording of article275 was compared
with the amendment of Mr. Karimuddin, he will find that practically there is no difference in what article 275 permits the
President to do and what he would been titled to if the amendment of Mr. Karimuddin was accepted. I therefore submit, Sir,
that there is no necessity for amendments Nos. 801 and 802. So far as I am concerned, No.801 is entirely against the principle
which I have enunciated.
I will take up the amendments of my friend Mr. Kamath, No. 787 read with No. 34 in List III, and the amendment
of my friend Mr. Sarwate, No. 783 as amended by NO. 43. My friend Mr. Kamath suggested that it was not necessary to particularize,
if I understood him correctly, the various writs as the article at present does and that the matter should be left quite open
for the Supreme Court to evolve such remedies as it may think proper in the circumstances of the case. I do not think Mr.
Kamath has read this article very carefully. If he had read the article carefully, he would have observed that what has been
done in the draft is to give general power as well as to propose particular remedies. The language of the article is very
"The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders is the nature of the writs of......"
These are quite general and wide terms.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Yes, the words" directions and orders" are there.
Shri H. V. Kamath: And "writs".
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar: Yes.
While the powers of the Supreme Court to issue orders and directions are there, the draft Constitution has
thought it desirable to mention these particular writs. Now, the necessity for mentioning and making reference to these particular
writs is quite obvious. (These writs have been inexistence in Great Britain for a number of years. Their nature and the remedies
that they provided are known to every lawyer and consequently we thought that as it is impossible even for a man who has a
most fertile imagination to invent something new, it was hardly possible to improve upon the writs which have been in existence
for probably thousands of years and which have given complete satisfaction to every Englishman with regard to the protection
of his freedom. We therefore thought that a situation such as the one which existed in the English jurisprudence which contained
these writs and which, If I may say so, have been found to be knave-proof and fool-proof, ought to be mentioned by their name
in the Constitution without prejudice to the right of the Supreme Court to do justice in some other way if it felt it was
desirable to do so.) I, therefore, say that Mr. Kamath need have to ground of complaint on that account.
My friend Mr. Sarwate said that while exercising the powers given under this article, the Court should have
the freedom to enter into the facts of the case. I have no doubt about it that Mr. Sarwate has misunderstood the scope and
nature of these writs. I therefore, think, that I need make no apology for explaining the nature of these writs. (Any one
who knows anything about the English law will realise and understand that the writs which are referred to in the article fall
into two categories. They are called in one sense "prerogative writs",
in the other case they are called" writs in action". A writ of mandamus, a writ of prohibition, a writ of
certiorari, can be used or applied for both; it can be used as a prerogative writ or it may be applied for by a litigant in
the course of a suit or proceedings. The importance of these writs which are given by this article lies in the fact that they
are prerogative writs; they can be sought for by an aggrieved party without bringing any proceedings or suit. Ordinarily you
must first file a suit before you can get any kind of order from the Court, whether the order is of the nature of mandamus,
prohibition or certiorari or anything of the kind. But here, so far as this article is concerned, without filing any proceedings
you can straightaway go to the Court and apply for the writ. The object of the writ is really to grant what I may call interim
relief.) For instance, if a man is arrested, without filing a suit or a proceeding against the officer who arrests him, he
can file a petition to the Court for setting him at liberty. It is not necessary for him to first file a suit or a proceeding
against the officer. (In a proceeding of this kind where the application is for a prerogative writ, all that the Court can
do is to ascertain whether the arrest is in accordance with law. The Court at that stage will not enter into the question
whether the law under which a person is arrested is a good law or a bad law, whether it conflicts with any of the provisions
of the Constitution or whether it does not conflict. All that the Court can inquire in a habeas corpus proceedings is whether
the arrest is lawful and will not enter into the question--at least that is the practice of the Court--of the merits of the
law. When a person is actually arrested and his trial has commenced, it is in the course of those proceedings that the court
would be entitled to go into the facts and to come to a decision whether a particular law under which a person is arrested
is a good law or a bad law. Then the court will go into the question whether it conflicts with the provisions of the Constitution.
Consequently, the amendment moved by my friend Shri V. S. Sarwate, if I may say so, is quite out of place. It is not here
that such a provision could be made. If he refers to article 115, he will find that a provision for similar writs has been
made there. But those are writs which could be issued in connection with questions of fact and law. They would certainly be
investigated by the Courts.)
Now, Sir, I am very glad that the majority of those who spoke on this article have realised the importance
and the significance of this article. If I was asked to name any particular article in this Constitution as the most important--an
article without which this Constitution would be a nullity--I could not refer to any other article except this one. It is
the very soul of the Constitution and the very heart of it and I am glad that the House has realized its importance.
There is however one thing which I find that the Members who spoke on this have not sufficiently realised.
It is to this fact that I would advert before I take my seat.(These writs to which reference is made in this article are in
a sense not new. Habeas corpus exists in our Criminal Procedure Code. The writ of Mandamus finds a place in our law of Specific
Relief and certain other writs which are referred to here are also mentioned in our various laws. But there is this difference
between the situation as it exists with regard to these writs and the situation as will now arise after the passing of this
Consultation. The writs which exist now in our various laws are at the mercy of the legislature. Our Criminal Procedure Code
which contains a provision with regard to habeas corpus can be amended by the existing legislature. Our Specific Relief Act also can be amended and the writ of habeas corpus and the right of mandamus can
be taken away without any difficulty whatsoever by a legislature which happens to have a majority and that majority happens
to be a single-minded majority. Here after it would not be possible for any legislature to takeaway the writs which are mentioned
in this article. It is not that the Supreme Court is left to be invested with the power to issue these writs by a law to be
made by the legislature at its sweet will. The Constitution has invested the Supreme Court with these rights and these writs
could not be taken away unless and until the Constitution itself is amended by means left open to the Legislature. This in
my judgment is one of the greatest safeguards that can be provided for the safety and security of the individual. (We need
not therefore have much apprehension that the freedoms which this Constitution has provided will be taken away by any legislature
merely because it happens to have a majority.)
Sir, there is one other observation which I would like to make. In the course of the debates that have taken
place in this House both on the Directive Principles and on the Fundamental Rights. I have listened to speeches made by many
members complaining that we have not enunciated a certain right or a certain policy in our Fundamental Rights or in our Directive
Principles. References have been made to the Constitution of Russia and to the Constitutions of other countries where such
declarations, as members have sought to introduce by means of amendments, have found a place. Sir, I think I might say without
meaning any offence to anybody who has made himself responsible for these amendments that. (I prefer the British method of
dealing with rights, The British method is a peculiar method, a very real and a very sound method.) British jurisprudence insists that there can be no right unless the Constitution provides a remedy for
it. It is the remedy that makes a right real. If there is no remedy, there is no right
of all, and I am therefore not prepared to burden the Constitution with a number of pious declarations which may sound as
glittering generalities but for which the Constitution makes no provision by way of a remedy. It is much better to be limited
in the scope of our rights and to make them real by enunciating remedies than to have a lot of pious wishes embodied in the
Constitution. I am very glad that this House has seen that the remedies that we have provided constitute a fundamental part
of this Constitution.) Sir, with these words I commend this article to the House.